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Abstract
This paper examines the issue of optimal tari®s for a small economy that trades with
a large economy. We de¯ne `small' and `large' in the sense that the world prices
are determined solely by the large country and, therefore, the small country faces
exogenously given world prices. Within this framework it is shown that there exist
situations in which the small country has an incentive to behave as a Stackelberg
leader by committing itself to a non-zero optimal tari®. Although the small country
is unable to directly a®ect world prices, by pre-committing to a non-zero trade tax it
may induce a reduction of the large country's optimal trade tax, thereby indirectly
improving its terms of trade and welfare.
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One of the best known rules of international trade policy is that small open economies
have no ¯rst-best argument for intervening in trade. The consequence of this is that
small economies should pursue free trade. The rationality behind this rule is based on
the fact that small economies by de¯nition face exogenously given world prices and,
thus, are unable to in°uence their terms-of-trade.
There are, of course, well-known exceptions to the general rule that small open
economies should pursue free trade policies. These exceptions are typically based upon
second-best arguments, political economy arguments and imperfect competition in
product markets.1 On the other hand, even within the context of perfectly competitive
markets without distortions, free trade for a small open economy is not necessarily
best. In particular, Mayer (1981) argues that a small country negotiating with a large
country over tari®s will ¯nd it optimal to accede to an import subsidy. Mayer (1981,
p.144) demonstrates that \a small open economy is not best o® if it unilaterally adopts
a free trade policy" and argues that \the frequently made statement that free trade is
best for a small country only applies to non-collusive situations".
The objective of the present paper is to show that, in addition to Mayer's
argument, there is another situation where a small economy ¯nds it optimal to depart
from a free trade policy when trading with a large economy. More speci¯cally, we
will show that even if the small economy has a zero optimal trade tax at the Nash
equilibrium, it may have a non-zero optimal trade tax at the Stackelberg equilibrium.
In other words, if the small country is able to pre-commit itself to non-zero trade taxes,
and thus behave as a Stackelberg leader, it can thereby increase its level of utility. In
contrast to Mayer, whose argument is based upon a collusive agreement between two
countries to reduce trade distortions, our argument is based upon non-cooperative
behaviour by both countries.
The story that we intend to tell is the following. Consider a small economy
1Throughout the paper we abstract from such arguments for trade intervention.
1that trades with a large economy and de¯ne `small' and `large' in the following sense:
world prices are determined solely by the linear technology and trade taxes of the
large economy and, therefore, the small economy faces exogenously given world prices.
Welfare maximization with respect to the trade tax gives the tari® reaction function
for each country. The Nash equilibrium will be characterized by a positive trade tax
for the large country and a zero trade tax for the small country since, as a small
nation, it cannot in°uence world prices directly via tari® policy given the chosen tari®
of the large country. However, it will be shown that the small country may not play
a Nash strategy in this game. Indeed, it may be optimal for the small country to
assume, if feasible, the role of a Stackelberg leader.2 Taking into account the large
country's tari® reaction function, the small country has an incentive to pre-commit
itself to a non-zero trade tax as that will provide the large country with an incentive
for reducing its trade tax. In this sense, even if the small country cannot in°uence
directly the world prices, it can in°uence them indirectly through the large country's
trade policy.3
This result echoes a similar result that is derived in the context of a small open
economy facing an imperfectly competitive (monopolistic) supplier (see Katrak (1977),
Svedberg (1979), De Meza (1979), Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984) and Jones and
Takemori (1989)). In that literature the small economy also has an incentive to set a
positive tari® based on a wish to in°uence its supply price. This incentive will exist
only if the monopolistic supplier can price discriminate among buyers/countries and,
thus, only if some market segmentation exists. The story in our model is di®erent not
only becauseit considers perfectly competitive product markets but, most importantly,
because our result does not depend on price discrimination (which is not allowed under
2The role of being a Stackelberg leader is not exogenous in this paper. It is decided endogenously
in an extended game in which countries ¯rst choose, simultaneously, whether they want to be leaders
or followers and then play the trade tax game. In game theoretic jargon, this implies that countries
play a non-cooperative game of endogenous timing (see for details Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)). As
is well known in this extended game setting, a sequential entry (Stackelberg) equilibrium will exist
only if it leads to strict Pareto improvements. For an application of endogenous timing in commercial
policy games see Syropoulos (1994).
3This ability to indirectly a®ect world prices is not inconsistent with its characterization (using
the accepted de¯nition) as a small open economy that cannot directly in°uence world prices, given
the trade policies of other countries.
2the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause in the GATT agreement).
In the following section we set up the model of trade between a `large' and a
`small' country. We discuss, in particular, what we mean by the terms `large' and
`small' in the present context. Section 3 deals with the strategies available to the
two countries. Countries are maximizing their welfare by choosing (at stage one)
whether they should pre-commit and (at stage two) their optimal trade tax. By
allowing pre-commitment we allow for the resulting subgame equilibrium to be either
the Nash equilibrium or the Stackelberg equilibrium (see the discussion in footnote
2). It is shown that, if the two countries' trade taxes are strategic substitutes, the
solution is the Nash equilibrium in which the small economy has a zero trade tax.
However, if trade taxes are strategic complements, the solution may be the Stackelberg
equilibrium in which the small country imposes an import subsidy. Section 4 deals
with the case where there are many small countries. In this context, it is shown
that each small country may have an incentive to impose non-zero trade taxes for the
reasons mentioned above. The ¯nal section concludes with some general remarks on
our results.
2 The model
We employ the standard model of international trade consisting of two countries trad-
ing in perfectly competitive international markets, with the additional feature that
one country is large relative to the other in a sense explained further below. Specif-
ically, we assume that there are two countries, labeled ® and ¯; that trade N goods
in perfectly competitive markets. The international price vector of goods is denoted
by p, and, without loss of generality, good 1 is chosen as the numeraire. The speci¯c
trade tax vector imposed by country i on goods is denoted by ti , i = ®;¯.
Employing standard trade expenditure functions and assuming that the entire
trade tax revenue is distributed to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion, we can write























¯) = 0; (4)
where ui is the social utility level, and mi(p+ti;ui) ´ Ei
p(p+ti;ui) is the compensated
or Hicksian import demand function for goods by country i. It will be useful for
the ensuing analysis to de¯ne the reduced-form import functions as M®(p;t®) and
M¯(p;t¯), which are obtained by substituting the solution to the budget constraints
(3) and (4) for utility, ui, into the compensated import demand functions.
The model is completed with the equilibrium condition for the world markets







¯) = 0: (5)
The equilibrium solution to the model, consisting of equations (3)-(5), yields the utility
levels and the world price vector as functions of the exogenously given tari® vectors
as ui = Ui(t®;t¯) and p = P(t®;t¯):
It is assumed that one of the countries is `large' and the other `small'. The
usual interpretation of this distinction between `large' and `small' countries is that the
latter has a negligible e®ect upon world prices if its trade vector were to change for any
reason: world prices are determined by the preferences and technology of the `large'
country. Accordingly, the `small' country treats the world price vector parametrically,
outside of its direct control. This distinction is sometimes re°ected in the o®er curve
for the `large' country having very little curvature. Equilibrium occurs at a point of
intersection between this `almost linear' o®er curve and the o®er curve of the small
4See Dixit and Norman (1980) and Woodland (1982) for the properties of the trade expenditure
function and textbook expositions of the use of duality in trade theory.
4country. Because of the `almost linear' property of the `large' country's o®er curve, a
shift in the `small' country's o®er curve, caused by a unilateral change in tari®s for
example, would alter the equilibrium point but the world price ratios would not alter
very much.
While this approach could have been taken in this paper, we prefer to take this
argument to its limit by assuming that the small country has no e®ect upon world
prices and that the`large' country has a (locally) linear o®er curve.5 Let ® bethe `large'
country. By the term `large' we mean that country ®'s domestic price vector, p®, is
¯xed. This is due, we assume, to the country having a linear transformation function
implying that the price vector allowing diversi¯cation in production is the unique
vector normal to the transformation function. A consequence of this assumption is
that the o®er curve, de¯ning the set of trade vectors that the country is willing to
entertain, also has a linear segment. Moreover, the country's trade indi®erence curves
also have linear segments. It is assumed that country ¯ is `small' in the sense that its
o®er curve cuts the linear segment of the o®er curve of ®. Accordingly, the equilibrium
price vector is completely determined by the technology of the `large' country. This is
the standard treatment of the large-country/small-country distinction, as exempli¯ed
in Mayer's (1981, pp.142-144) analysis of tari® negotiations between a large and a
small open economy, for example.6
Some further comments on our small-country/large-country model speci¯cation
may be warranted at this point. First, in our speci¯cation, the `small' country is,
indeed, small in the accepted sense of the term in the international trade literature.
The `small' country is small in the sense that its contribution to world production is
su±ciently minor so that it is unable to directly in°uence world prices by changing
5Our assumption that the o®er curve of the large country has a big linear segment ensures that the
small country cannot alter the world prices directly. It would not be di±cult to relax this assumption
by assuming that the large country's o®er curve was very elastic throughout the relevant range.
The results below would then follow as a limiting case of this more general model. However, for
expositional purposes, we prefer to deal explicitly with the linear model. See, for example, Woodland
(1982, p.180-187) and Salvatore (1990, p.36-38) for a discussion on, and illustrations of, o®er curves
that exhibit linearity in the context of Ricardian trade models.
6For another example, see Richardson's (1995) model of a customs union between two small
economies trading with a large economy, which has ¯xed domestic prices. For textbook references
to this approach to the small open economy see, for example, Ethier (1995, p.111, pp.195-196) and
Salvatore (1990, pp.86-87).
5its net exports. Second, it is neither appropriate nor su±cient to use the size of
a country's trade vector to infer anything about its size. In any two-country trade
model the market equilibrium condition ensures that the trade vectors of the two
countries are of equal length, but this says nothing about their relative sizes. Third,
size normally refers to countries' productive capacity as re°ected in the sizes of their
production possibility sets or factor endowments. This will have an e®ect upon the
maximal size of net exports, and hence upon the nature of the o®er curve of each
country. Fourth, and most important for the discussion at hand, the ability of any
country to directly a®ect world prices (by an exogenous shift in its net export function,
for example) depends upon the responsiveness of world net exports to a change in price,
as measured by the slope of the world excess supply function. If the `rest of the world'
net export function is particularly price elastic, the world net export function will be
similarly elastic and the e®ect of the small country on world prices will be particularly
small. It is in this sense that international trade theorists model the small open
economy: the o®er curve facing it is virtually linear.
Finally, another approach to the `small' country assumption is to assume that
the country is just one of a large number of trading countries. Treating the `rest-of-
the-world' as the `large' country, we get back to something similar to the situation
described above in which the `rest-of-the-world' o®er curve is virtually linear. The
important di®erence is that our `large' country is assumed to have an active trade
policy, which is not the case when the `large' country is simply a convenient aggregation
of many small countries. Accordingly, our small-country/large-country speci¯cation
has the distinguishing feature that our `large' country is, indeed, large and its existence
as a trade policy maker is an important part of the model.7
The large country assumption implies that the compensated import demand
m®(p + t®;u®) and the uncompensated import demand M®(p;t®) are actually cor-
respondences at the crucial domestic price vector p® = p + t®: Thus, for country
7Given that one of the countries is genuinely large, the question arises as to whether our analysis
is a®ected if there are many small countries trading with this one large country. Further below we
deal brie°y with this issue and argue that our analysis is basically una®ected by having many small
countries.
6® the import demand vector is a point in a convex set of possible points, that is,
m® 2 m®(p+ t®;u®) and m® 2 M®(p;t®): At other domestic price vectors these com-
pensated and uncompensated import demands are generally functions, of course. The






¯) = 0; (6)
where m® 2 m®(p + t®;u®) and p + t® = p®: As indicated above, it is assumed that
the equilibrium is on the linear segment of the large country's o®er curve, implying
that ®0s domestic price vector is exogenously given as p®.
The large-country/small-country assumption is illustrated for the case where
there are just two traded products in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the o®er curves of
the two nations labelled as OiF for the free trade case, the o®er curve for country ®
containing a linear segment. The free trade equilibrium trading point is labelled F
where ¯'s nonlinear o®er curve intersects ®'s o®er curve on its linear segment. Ac-
cordingly, the free trade world price vector coincides with the large country's domestic
price vector, p®;which is normal to the linear segment of ®'s o®er curve. Country ¯ is
`small' and country ® is `large' in the sense that the free trade equilibrium is on the
linear segment of ®'s o®er curve, not on its nonlinear part.
3 Strategic behaviour and tari® formation
The model description presented above treated the tari® vectors as exogenous vari-
ables. In this section we treat the tari® vectors as endogenous variables chosen by
the governments of countries ® and ¯: Moreover, and prior to the choice of tari®s,
countries decide whether they should pre-commit to a trade policy, i.e. whether to be
a leader or a follower in this commercial policy game. Formally, the game is composed
of two stages: in the ¯rst stage countries announce simultaneously whether they wish
to be leaders or followers and in the second stage countries implement their optimal
trade tax policy, given the outcome of the ¯rst stage of the game. The Nash equilib-
7rium is reached if countries announce the same timing and a Stackelberg equilibrium
is reached if they do not.8 To achieve subgame perfection we proceed by solving the
model backwards.
3.1 Stage two of the game
At stage two of the game countries choose trade taxes, given the trade policy stance of
each country established in the ¯rst stage. There can be three possible policy stances
or timings: (i) countries act simultaneously, (ii) the small country acts as a leader,
and (iii) the large country acts as a leader.
3.1.1 Countries act simultaneously
This is the case where each country chooses its own tari® vector optimally to max-
imize its own welfare, taking the tari® choices by the other country as given (Nash






i = 0; i = ®;¯; (7)
if the reduced form utility functions are di®erentiable.
Since p® = p + t® is given, the large country ® has complete control over the
world price vector through the choice of its tari® vector t®: It is therefore able to
exploit this power and so increase its utility by setting a non-zero tari® vector, even
though its trading partner is small. Using the market equilibrium condition (6), the













8An implicit assumption in this approach is that we treat countries' pre-commitment ability in a
symmetric way. Clearly, this may not be realistic. Large countries may have a greater credibility in
their choice of trade taxes and thus, arguably, they may also have a higher ability to pre-commit. By
assuming symmetry in the countries' ability to pre-commit we remove this potential advantage of the
large country. However, as shown below, there are cases where the large country will bene¯t by letting
the small country pre-commit. Thus, in these cases, even if the large country could pre-commit, its
best interest is not to do so.
8where the last equality follows since the import functions satisfy Walras' Law that
pM¯(p;t¯) = 0: Country ® is assumed to choose the world price vector p to maximize
its utility subject to its budget constraint (8) and to the tari® vector t¯ chosen by
country ¯. Since it is assumed that the expenditure function is increasing in utility,
it is evident that the country has to maximize the right hand side of (8), which is its




¯) = 0; (9)
where rpM¯(p;t¯) is the matrix of derivatives of ¯'s import demand functions with
respect to the world price vector p. This is the familiar optimal tari® condition, which
(along with the market equilibrium conditions) yields the solution for p and hence
t® = p® ¡ p: This optimal tari® condition also implicitly de¯nes the reaction function
for country ® and this may be written as t® = R®(t¯): Thus, in general, the large
country will impose a tari® on the small country to maximize the large country's
tari® revenue and hence maximize its utility.9 While it may seem strange that a large
economy imposes a tari® on its imports from a small open economy, it should be
recognized that the large country has complete control over world prices and therefore
¯nds it worthwhile to exploit the curvature of the small economy's o®er curve; the
gains to the large country may be small but they are unambiguously positive and are
therefore extracted by a welfare optimizing government of the large country.
Now we consider the optimal tari® choice of the small country. Since the small
country cannot directly in°uence world prices, which are totally under the control of
the large country, the optimal tari® of the small country is zero. To see this formally,











where the import vector m® is in the set of feasible trades determined by the nature
of ®'s o®er correspondence, that is, m® 2 M®(p;t®): Country ¯ chooses its domestic
9Richardson (1995, footnote 8) notes this result in his simulations within the context of two small
countries forming a customs union, as does Mayer (1981, p.143) in his treatment of tari® negotiations.
9price vector p¯; and hence its tari® vector t¯ = p¯¡p; and the import vector of country
® to maximize its utility, given the tari® vector of the large country and, hence, the
world price vector. Since the large country's import vector satis¯es Walras' Law that
pm® = 0 it is evident that a solution to this problem requires that t¯ = p¯¡p = 0: The
optimal tari® of the small country is clearly zero, as is well known. Thus its reaction
function is t¯ = R¯(t®) ´ 0 for all t®:
Thus, Nash behaviour involves the small country choosing zero tari®s while the
large country chooses non-zero tari®s to exploit its market power. This situation is
illustrated for the case where there are just two traded products in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 shows the o®er curves of the two nations labelled as OiF for the free trade
case and as OiN when Nash tari®s are imposed. The Nash trading point is labelled
N where ®'s (partially) linear trade indi®erence curve is tangent to ¯'s o®er curve.
The same situation is depicted by Figure 2 in the tari® space, and corresponds to
the situation depicted in Figure 4 of Mayer's (1981) analysis of tari® negotiations
between a large and small economy. It is assumed, without loss of generality, that
the numeraire (good 1) is never taxed. Consequently, ® sets a negative `import' tax
(positive export tax) on its exports of good 2, while ¯ imposes no import duty.10
3.1.2 Small country acts as a leader
In this case we assume that the small country can pre-commit its trade tax policy to
a level that maximizes its welfare taking the large country's tari® reaction function as
given. The small country ¯ knows that the large country ® will react to any tari® ¯ sets
by moving along its reaction function, which describes the optimal tari® response for
®: Rather than take ® 's tari® vector as given, ¯ can choose to take ®'s tari® behaviour
as given. This behaviour is described by the reaction function t® = R®(t¯) and by the
consequent e®ect upon world prices as described by p = p®¡t® = p®¡R®(t¯) ´ P(t¯):
Observing this relationship, ¯ recognizes that it can in°uence world prices, not because
10When working with the two dimensional case we have chosen to use t® to denote only
the trade tax on the non-numeraire good. However convenient this may be, readers should
be aware that this departs slightly from our generall notation, in which t® is the full vector
of trade taxes (including the numeraire, whose tax rate is always zero).
10it has direct market power but because the large country does and it (the small
country) can in°uence the trade policy choice of the large country and, hence, it can
indirectly a®ect world prices.
The optimal choice of tari®s by the small country ¯ can be characterized by














¯ and p = P(t
¯): (12)
The small country chooses its tari® vector t¯ to maximize utility subject to this budget
constraint that embodies the market equilibrium condition and the optimal tari® be-













where rtP(t¯) ´ @P(t¯)=@t¯ is the matrix of derivatives of world prices with respect
to the tari® vector of country ¯ and rtM¯(p;t¯) ´ @M¯(p;t¯)=@t¯ is the matrix
of derivatives of ¯'s imports with respect to its tari® vector. The matrix rtP(t¯)
indicates the indirect e®ect that country ¯ has on world prices and this will be non-
zero in general. Thus, in general, the optimal Stackelberg tari® vector will not be
zero.
Because the characterization of the optimal tari®s under the Stackelberg stra-
tegy as provided aboveis fairly complex, we now explicitly consider the two-commodity
case and employ a diagrammaticargument. As is well known, theresults of Stackelberg
behaviour depends crucially upon the slopes of the two countries' reaction functions.
In our case, the reaction function of the small country ¯ is horizontal, meaning that
its optimal Nash tari® is zero whatever the large country ® chooses at its trade tax.
However, the reaction function of the large country ® may be positively or negatively
sloped in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium.
11First, consider the case where t® and t¯ are strategic substitutes for country ®,
i.e. the slope of ®'s reaction function is positive.11;12 If country ¯ were able to assume
the role of trade policy leader, it would observe that it could raise its level of utility by
moving along ®'s positively sloped reaction function away from the Nash equilibrium.
This movement can be achieved by imposing an import duty. The change in utility
for country ¯ is du¯ = U¯
®dt® in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, where
dt®=dt¯ = ¡U®
¯¯=U®
¯® > 0 along ®'s reaction curve under the assumption that the
trade taxes are strategic substitutes.13 Since U¯
® > 0; indicating that an increase in
®'s trade tax will reduce ¯'s welfare, it follows that a small import duty imposed by the
small country will raise its welfare. Away from the Nash equilibrium the calculations
are more complex but we suppose that an optimal point is reached along the large
country's reaction curve. Thus, the small country will not choose free trade as its
Stackelberg policy. Proposition 1 formalizes this point.
Proposition 1: When a small economy trades with a large economy and trade taxes
are strategic substitutes, the small country will prefer to act as a Stackelberg leader by
imposing a positive trade tax.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the Stackelberg equilibrium in relation to the Nash
equilibrium solution. At point S of Figure 2, country ¯ is on the highest possible
indi®erence curve that can be attained along the reaction curve of country ®: Its
Stackelberg strategy is therefore to choose tari® t¯S. Given this choice of tari®, country
® chooses its optimal policy, which is to reduce its export tax by moving to t®S. Point
S is thus the Stackelberg equilibrium. We observe that the Stackelberg strategy by
the small country increases its welfare at the expense of the large country.
11The reader should note that an increase of t® represents a reduction of the export tax. It is in this
sense that an increase of t¯ followed by an increase of t® is referred to as strategic substitutability.
12According to the majority of the literature, see e.g. Mayer (1981) and Dixit (1987), this is the
`normal' case and the case that is reported in many trade textbooks, e.g. Vousden (1990) and Wong
(1995). However, it is true that, under general assumptions on preferences and technology, trade
taxes may also be strategic complements (see Johnson (1953)).
13Recall that subscripts are used to denote derivatives. Thus, for example, in the present context
we have that U¯
® ´ @U¯(t®;t¯)=@t® and U®
¯® ´ @U®
¯ (t®;t¯)=@t®.
12Second, consider the case where the large country's reaction function is nega-
tively sloped in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, meaning that the trade
taxes are strategic complements from the large country's point of view. This situation
is more complex. Figure 3 illustrates two possible situations. In Figure 3a the small
country does not ¯nd it in its interest, as a Stackelberg leader, to impose a small pos-
itive import duty since any small upward movement along ®'s reaction curve reduces
¯'s welfare. On the other hand, a large positive import duty, yielding the Stackelberg
equilibrium point S as the point of tangency between ¯'s highest indi®erence curve
and ®'s reaction function, will be in its interest. In this case, the large country su®ers
a reduction in utility, so a Pareto improvement in welfare does not occur.
In Figure 3b the small country again does not ¯nd it in its interest, as a Stackel-
berg leader, to impose a small positive import duty since any small upward movement
along ®'s reaction curve reduces ¯'s welfare. However, an import subsidy yielding the
Stackelberg equilibrium point S will be to the small country's advantage. In this in-
stance the large country also experiences an increase in utility so a Pareto improvement
ensues.14 This argument may be summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2: When a small economy trades with a large economy and trade taxes
are strategic complements in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, the small
country will prefer to act as a Stackelberg leader by imposing either an import tari® or
an import subsidy. In the latter case, both countries experience an increase in utility.
In summary, we have demonstrated that, if the small country is able to assume
the position of Stackelberg leader in a tari® policy game with a large country, it
will increase its welfare over the Nash equilibrium by imposing an import duty or
an import subsidy. In the case where the large country regards the trade taxes as
strategic substitutes an import tari® will be imposed by the small country, whereas if
14A Pareto improvement exists here because the import subsidy of ¯ induces ® to subsidize its
exports, thus increasing the volume of trade and moving towards the set of Pareto optimal trade
taxes. The resulting Stackelberg equilibrium is similar to the collusive agreement between large and
small countries in which the small country imposes an import subsidy (see Mayer (1981, p.144)).
13trade taxes are strategic complements the Stackelberg optimal policy could, depending
on the circumstances, be an import duty or subsidy.
3.1.3 Large country acts as a leader
Now assume that it is the large country that can pre-commit its trade tax policy that
maximizes its welfare taking the small country's tari® reaction function as given.
The Stackelberg strategy of the large country is easy to characterize as it does
not depend on whether tari®s are strategic substitutes or complements. As it can be
seen from Figures 2 and 3, the reaction function of country ¯ is horizontal, which
implies that the Nash tari® vector is also the Stackelberg tari® vector for the large
country. In short, if country ® assumes the role of being the Stackelberg leader it will
set its tari® vector equal to the Nash tari® vector, knowing that the small country ¯,
being the follower, will always choose free trade as its policy.
3.2 Stage one of the game
We now turn to stage one of the game where each country's trade policy stance is
treated endogenously. In this stage of the game, countries decide whether to act as
leaders or as followers, knowing the implications of their choice on the second stage of
the game and thus on their welfare. If both countries choose the same policy stance,
i.e. if both choose to be leaders or followers, entry will occur simultaneously and
the equilibrium will be Nash. If countries choose di®erent policy stances, entry will
occur sequentially and the equilibrium will be Stackelberg. Clearly, by adopting this
framework, a Stackelberg equilibrium will take place if, and only if, it leads to a strict
Pareto improvement in welfare.
As shown in the previous subsection, in the cases depicted in Figure 2 and
Figure 3a, both countries will prefer to announce `leader' in the ¯rst stage of the game
since each will be worse o® by choosing to be a `follower'. Accordingly, in these cases,
14the resulting equilibrium will be the Nash equilibrium in which the large country sets
its optimal tari® and the small country has a zero optimal trade tax policy.
In the case depicted in Figure 3b, however, the small country will choose to
announce `leader', but now the large country will announce `follower' as its preferred
choice. The large country attains a higher level of utility if the small country is leader
and the equilibrium is at S than it does by assuming the leadership and being at
the Nash equilibrium, N. Thus, in this case, the Stackelberg solution is the equilib-
rium outcome of the extended game. These results are summarized in the following
Proposition.
Proposition 3: When a small economy trades with a large economy and trade taxes
are strategic complements in the neighbourhood of the Nash equilibrium, the extended
game equilibrium may be the Stackelberg equilibrium with the small country, as leader,
imposing an import subsidy. If trade taxes are strategic substitutes, then the solution
to the extended game is the Nash equilibrium.
The above analysis has demonstrated that, when a small country trades with
a large country and when both countries behave non-cooperatively with respect to
their trade policy strategy and with respect to their pre-commitment strategy, there
may exist an equilibrium where both governments intervene. The small country will
pre-commit itself to an import subsidy and the large country will impose an export
tax which, notably, will be smaller than the export tax imposed if the small country
was pursuing free trade.
The advantage of this Stackelberg equilibrium, compared to any other non-
cooperative equilibria, is that it is Pareto dominating. Figure 3b demonstrates this
property of the Stackelberg equilibrium: point S lies in the Pareto dominating area
spanned between u®N and u¯N. Clearly, this equilibrium is not e±cient and there
exists a set of cooperative equilibria that are even better. In the ¯gure, one of these
cooperative equilibria is depicted as point P; where the small country's indi®erence
15curve u¯S is tangent to a higher utility indi®erence curve for the large country (not
shown). This equilibrium (and all the other cooperative equilibria) is characterized
by even higher import subsidies for the small country and by even lower export taxes
for the large country. In this sense, one of the conclusions reached in Mayer (1981,
p.144) concerning tari® negotiations between a small and a large country applies also
here: \The tari® settlement cannot lead to a free trade policy by either country."
4 Many small countries
Our analysis above assumes the existence of a single small country trading with a large
country. Before concluding, there is an important issue that deserves special comment,
namely the issue of whether having many small countries alters the above analysis in
any essential way. As we will see, complications do arise due to coordination and
free-riding issues but that these merely weaken, rather than invalidate, our argument.
For the sake of argument, assume that there are many, identical, and genuinely
small countries that are trading with the large country ®: In the context of Figure
1, therefore, assume that the o®er curve O¯F represents the (identical) o®er curve of
each of the small countries. Since the aggregation of all such `small' countries' o®er
curves intersects the linear part of the large country's o®er curve by assumption, the
Stackelberg story that this paper describes remains unchanged. The large country
imposes the same trade tax on the imports of each small country and they in turn
embrace free trade in the Nash equilibrium. Each of the small countries faces the
same `rest-of-the-world' o®er curve (not shown) that has a linear segment due to the
dominance of the large country, and so each small country will bene¯t by setting a
positive duty on the imports from the large country. Since each small country thereby
gains from a Stackelberg strategy, each small country imposes a tari® on its imports
and hence the o®er curve for each small country shifts to O¯S in Figure 1 inducing
the large country to alter its trade tax accordingly. Thus, the Stackelberg argument
continues to apply when there are many small countries trading with a single large
country with a linear technology.
16There is, however, a potential complication with this argument: while each of
the small countries knows that Stackelberg behaviour is best for them, each small
country may prefer the others to behave Stackelberg and thus free-ride on the rest. If
one small country chooses free trade while the others follow a Stackelberg strategy, the
large country will adjust its optimal tari® in accordance with the new aggregate o®er
curve and all small countries will bene¯t. In particular, the free-trading small economy
will bene¯t from the policy externality created by the others with no cost to itself in
terms of distorted domestic prices. While this country gains from free-riding, it will
gain even more by taking a protective stance. In particular, the free rider will further
bene¯t (marginally) from the imposition of a tari®, since this will alter (marginally)
the aggregate o®er curve facing the large country thus inducing a further small change
in its tari®. A similar argument applies if all countries embrace free trade: any one
will bene¯t marginally from taking a Stackelberg policy position.
Two further remarks are relevant here. First, our assumption that the small
countries are identical was convenient but it can be removed without changing the
basic argument. The large country will set an optimal tari® based upon the nature
of the aggregate o®er curve of the small countries. Each small country can alter the
aggregate o®er curve and hence alter the large country's optimal tari®.15 Second,
however, the marginal e®ect of each small country upon the optimal tari® of the large
country and hence upon the small country's welfare becomes smaller the greater the
number of small countries. While this means that the argument for protection becomes
empirically less important as the number of small countries increases, the theoretical
argument for the positivity of the welfare gain remains intact.
Thus, while the inclusion of many small countries weakens (due to free-riding)
the incentive that each country has to behave as a Stackelberg leader, the main point
of this paper is that this incentive nevertheless exists. The existing literature does not
15In this context it is worth noting that, due to the `most favoured nation' (MFN) clause of the
GATT agreement, the large country cannot impose a di®erent tax on the imports of each of the
small countries, as it would generally prefer. Thus, the large country has a single trade tax reaction
function and each small country can maximize its welfare subject to this reaction function. This
continues to apply even if only one of the small countries behaves as a Stackelberg leader and the
rest free-ride, for example.
17appear to be aware of this fact.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we treat the trade policy decisions of two countries as the result of a non-
cooperative game and consider alternative behavioural strategies. In this framework
we note that when a small country trades with a large country, the trade tax Nash
equilibrium will consist of positive trade taxes imposed by the large country and zero
trade taxes imposed by the small country, as previously noted by Mayer (1981), for
example. This Nash equilibrium conforms to the accepted notion that small countries
will choose free trade as their optimal trade policy. However, this outcome may not
be the best that the small country can attain if alternative trade policy strategies
are available. In particular, it has been demonstrated that the small country may be
able to reach a Stackelberg equilibrium that is superior to the Nash equilibrium, by
pre-committing to a non-zero tax on its international trade with the large country.
Accordingly, free trade may not be optimal for the small economy.
The italics used above are signi¯cant. The small country will be able to reach
a Stackelberg equilibrium if, and only if, the large country ¯nds it in its own interest
to let the small country be the Stackelberg leader. Of course, this will only happen
if the Stackelberg equilibrium leads to a strict Pareto improvement in welfare. We
have shown that this possibility of strict Pareto improvement exists only if tari®s are
strategic complements around the Nash equilibrium.
The main insight of this paper concerns the incentives that small open eco-
nomies have in behaving strategically. More precicely, it has been shown that the
established notion, that small economies have no incentives for strategic trade inter-
ventions, may not be true under more extended games of strategic behaviour.
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19Figure 1:
Figure 1: Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium in quantity space.
20Figure 2:
Figure 2: Nash and Stackelberg equilibrium in tari® space.
21Figure 3:
Figure 3a: Strategic complementarity and the case of import tari®.
22Figure 4:
Figure 3b: Strategic complementarity and the case of import subsidy.
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